Leszek Koczanowicz, Politics of Dialogue: Non-consensual Democracy and Critical Community by Santarelli, Matteo
 




Leszek KOCZANOWICZ, Politics of Dialogue: Non-
consensual Democracy and Critical Community










Matteo Santarelli, « Leszek KOCZANOWICZ, Politics of Dialogue: Non-consensual Democracy and Critical
Community », European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy [Online], IX-1 | 2017, Online
since 22 July 2017, connection on 24 September 2020. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/ejpap/
1016  ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/ejpap.1016 
This text was automatically generated on 24 September 2020.
Author retains copyright and grants the European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy right
of first publication with the work simultaneously licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
Leszek KOCZANOWICZ, Politics of
Dialogue: Non-consensual Democracy
and Critical Community
Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2015, 174 pages
Matteo Santarelli
REFERENCES
Leszek KOCZANOWICZ, Politics of Dialogue: Non-consensual Democracy and Critical Community,
Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2015, 174 pages
1 The crisis  of  democracy is  among the most compelling problems of our times.  This
crisis  has prompted and provoked heterogeneous theoretical  answers,  of  which the
deliberative and the agonistic models represent two of the most important responses.
The  first  proposal  –  as  an  example  I  will  take  Habermas’s  version  –  states  the
importance  of  a  mutually  recognized  normative  background,  which  allows  for  the
construction of a ground level of agreement and makes democratic discussion possible.
The second proposal  asserts  –  from Mouffe’s  version in  this  case  –  the  primacy of
conflict  as  a  defining  and  inescapable  feature  of  the  political  dimension.  Leszek
Koczanowicz’s  new  book  represents  an  interesting  attempt  to  move  beyond  both
attempts,  and at  the same time to keep and rephrase the most convincing insights
offered by each model.
2 Koczanowicz develops his proposal by means of an original comparison between two
different  theoretical  perspectives:  American pragmatism –  notably  John Dewey and
George  Herbert  Mead –  and Russian  philosophy of  language  –  in  the  person of  its
leading representative,  Mikhail  Bakhtin.  The author draws on these two sources in
order to articulate the two main features of his theory: the definition of democracy as a
way of life, and the assertion that understanding, and not agreement is the necessary
condition for democracy.
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3 The anti-formalistic understanding of democracy as a way of life is one of the peculiar
traits of Mead’s and Dewey’s political theory. Mead stresses the continuity between the
political dimension and the level of communicative social interaction. Democracy as a
political  form  is  then  a  development  and  articulation  of  the  potential  universality
expressed  by  the  communicative  interactions  which  permeate  everyday  life.  As
Koczanowicz clearly explains, this idea should not be understood as an over-optimistic
conception of politics and social interactions. In fact, Mead clearly acknowledges the
existence of situations in which personal and particular interests clash against each
other, making the emergence of a common social interest impossible. However, he is
equally aware that the human being is  endowed with the capacity to resolve these
conflicts  by means of  a  mutual  readjustment.  This  means that  a  social,  shared and
communicative reconstruction of interests is a possible, even if uncertain, outcome. 
4 The conception that democracy could be potentially ubiquitous in everyday life is also
present  in  Dewey.  Specifically,  the  nature  of  this  potentiality  is  well  expressed  by
Dewey’s  distinction  between  the  Great  Society  –  that  is,  modern  society  as
characterized by technological progress and the exceptional progress of “the physical
tools of communication” – and the Great Community – i.e. a society in which
individuals are able to share not only impersonal information, but also their “thoughts
and aspirations.” The achievement of the Great Community could be achieved by the
realization of a real democratic community, that is “a living entity” that presupposes
“undisturbed  communication  among  its  members”  (32).  This  lack  of  disturbances
should not be understood in purely negative terms. Overcoming of dualism between
society and the individual through open communication between particular interests is
contingent on the active participation of the individual. It requires the institution of
democracy as a way of life which permeates our everyday interactions.
5 By quoting Bohmam, Koczanowicz maintains that the pragmatist concept of democracy
is based on a process of “multiperspectival” common inquiry. The full development of
this  multiperspectival  shared inquiry  does  not  require  selected  and extraordinarily
gifted individuals: it is the outcome of education and the extension of “everyday human
communication” (33). Furthermore, such inquiry is not a purely cognitive task. Rather,
it contains “emotions, sentiments, and even prejudices as well” (33). The parallel task
of creating democratic  individuals  and a democratic  community is  an achievement,
rather than a presupposition. At the same time, as explained by Mead, this achievement
is  possible  in concrete terms,  as  long as  it  an extension and a refinement of  traits
already  present  in  common  interactions  –  the  universality  of  meanings,  and  our
capacity to take the attitude of the other.  Therefore, the political construction of a
democractic way of life does not take place in an extraordinary and privileged place in
social  life  –  as  argued  by  those  authors  asserting  the  autonomy  of  the  political
dimension (Schmitt, Harendt, Laclau among others).
6 However, this wider process of shared communication between plural interests should
not to be understood as a universalization of consensus and agreement.  Neither an
increased  capacity  to  take  the  attitude  of  the  other  (Mead)  nor  expanded
communication  between  plural  perspectives  and  interests  (Dewey)  will  involve  the
homegeneization of society into a fully shared consensus. Democracy “is a system in
where all voices should be respected” (36), rather than a system where all voices say
the same thing. This is the precise point where Koczanowicz proposes to integrate the
pragmatist  perspective  and  Mikhail  Bakhtin’s  theory  of  language.  Through  this
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connection, the author aims to distinguish between consensus/ agreement on the one
hand, and understanding on the other.
7 Bakhtin endorses a radically social conception of language. He claims that even the
elementary  unit  of  meaning  –  that  is,  utterance  –  “is  never  complete  unless  it  is
directed toward the other” (48). Single self-expressions are always incomplete, insofar
as they are separated from the responses of the other which they elicit. The basic unity
of social action and communication is the act, that is the merging between expression
and  social  answer.  Paraphrasing  Mead  (1934:  182),  we  could  say  that  according  to
Bakhtin the utterance is an eddy in the social stream. This eddy is the result of the
coexisting  centripetal  tendencies  (utterances  belong  to  a  common  and  shared
language)  and  social  “heteroglossia,”  that  is  the  “overabundance  of  language
phenomena, as well as the richness of expressions of social and cultural life” (52). This
dialectical  coexistence  of  centripetal  and  centrifugal  dynamics  grounds  the
contingency of dialogue. Even though dialogue is “permanently present in dialogical
relationships”  (54),  it  is  still  continuosly  threatened  by  purely  idiosincratic  and
individualistic  language  (poetic  language)  and  “unitary,  hegemonic  and  monologic
language,” which is an imposition of the ideology of the dominant class (54). 
8 Despite its contingency dialogue is always a viable possibility for human beings. And
dialogue  is  deeply  entangled  with  understanding.  Bakhtin’s  conception  of
understanding  is  incredibly  consonant  with  the  pragmatist  conception  of  meaning.
Understanding according to Bakhtin takes place only as long as a speech act is merged
with the response of the other: “Understanding comes to fruition only in the response.
Understanding  and  response  are  dialectically  merged  and  mutually  condition  each
other; one is impossibile without the other” (56; Bakhtin 1981: 282). More specifically:
“Bakhtin approximates Mead in his insistence that the process of exchange is the most
important factor in understanding.  Yet he differs from Mead in proposing that the
object of the exchange process is not another step towards universalization, but rather
constant construction and reconstuction of both conceptual horizons” (58). Thus, the
emergence of the response of the other, and more generally the encounter with the
other, remains “an enigma” (71). 
9 Given this constitutive coexistence of plurality and unity, of proximity and distance, of
identity and difference, understanding represents a viable alternative to consensus and
agreement. While consensus requires two or more people to share the same idea or
opinion about a certain subject, understanding is fully compatible with disagreement.
People can radically disagree with each other, while at the same time understanding
their respective points of view. Dialogue is then an omnipresent possibility in everyday
life, which can neither be reduced to a background of consensus and agreement, nor to
a permanent condition of conflict.
10 The convergence between pragmatist authors such as Mead and Dewey, and Bakhtin’s
theory of language structures Koczanowicz’s attempt to understand democracy as a
condition  which  permeates  human  life,  a  potentiality  inscribed  in  human
communication. But Bakhtin’s contribution to Koczanowicz’s theory of democracy is
not limited to his theory of dialogue. Another key role in the argumentative structure
of non-consensual democracy is played by his notion of carnival. 
11 But what does carnival have to do with democracy understood as something which
takes place in our everyday lives? According to Koczanowicz, Bakhtin’s theorization of
carnival has to do with fraternization, utopian meaning, degradation of power. During
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carnival, the king becomes a clown, and he is mocked and beaten; the sacred body of
power is brought back to earth. Insofar as it turns the official hierachies upside-down,
carnival can be understood as a revolutionary kind of conduct. This works not only in a
negative sense –  the degradation of  power –  but  also  in  a  positive  sense,  given its
“capacity to build authentic bonds” (78), by means of new and unconventional social
relations,  which  take  the  shape  of  bodily  contacts.  Therefore,  according  to
Koczanowicz’s  interpretation  of  Bakhtin,  carnival  is  “a  universal  phenomenon
somehow reflecting human nature and a potential of communication always harbored
in human relations” (82); “an ideal form for free and equal communication embodied in
real  gestures  of  real  people”  (84).  Moreover,  carnival  involves  the  original
communicative value of frankness. Frankness is the kind of communicative value which
allows  for  “a  look  at  the  other  side  of  established  values”  (85),  that  is,  for  new
perspectives and points of view beyond the official ideology. 
12 The  concepts  of  dialogue,  understanding  and  carnival  constitute  the  bedrock  of
Koczanowicz’s  theoretical  proposal.  This  proposal  hinges  on  two  original  concepts:
critical  community  and  non-consensual  democracy.  Critical  community  is  defined
according to the four criteria: “1) bringing together the public and the private spheres;
2)  promoting  critical  identification  with  tradition  and,  at  the  same  time,  fostering
openness to other traditions so that  particular  identities  can always be negated;  3)
providing a basis for democracy and reacting flexibly to democratic transformations;
and 4) combining universal regulatory principles with specific ways of realising them
through  reliance  on  emotions  and  bodiliness”  (136).  According  to  Koczanowicz:
“Critical community members constanly find themselves in a dialogical tension, which
makes them subject to the pressure of tradition and institutions and, at the same time,
capable  of  shaping  them”  (139).  The  political  counterpart  of  critical  community  is
represented by non-consensual democracy. Non-consesual democracy is a democracy
based on reflexive understanding rather than on agreement (163), on solidarity, and on
the  capacity  of  citizens  to  problematize  “the  given.”  The  connection  and  the
complementarity  of  critical  community  and  non-consensual  democracy  depicts  a
theoretical landscape in which citizens can acknowledge the centrality of community
bonds  while  at  the  same  time  conserving  their  reflexive  and  critical  capacity  as
individuals. The framework of this proposal coincides with a conception of language
and  communication  as  a  field  of  constant  tension  between  social/centripetal  and
individual/centrifugal forces. The convergence between pragmatist thinkers – such as
Mead  and  Dewey  –  and  Bakhtin  on  this  issue  is  extremely  interesting,  and  its
reconstruction by Koczanowicz praiseworthy.
13 Non-consensual democracy represents an interesting contribution to the current debates
concerning  the  crisis  of  democracy.  Specifically,  it  fits  into  a  current  in  recent
pragmatist scholarship, promoting a critical discussion between pragmatist thought –
especially Dewey – and new theorists of hegemony – such as Ernesto Laclau and Chantal
Mouffe.1 Koczanowicz  provides  good  reasons  for  taking  a  critical  view  of  the  two
decisive assumptions of the aforementioned theory of hegemony: the autonomy of the
political sphere and its identification with the dimension of conflict. At the same time,
his  reconstruction  of  the  notion  of  dialogue  entails  a  simultaneous  refusal  of
consensus-based models of democracy. While opening the possibility of understanding
each other without the necessity of agreeing with each other, the fulfilment of dialogue
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is always a contingent outcome in the complexity of everyday life’s interactions and in
the ongoing dialogue between centripetal and centrifugal social forces. 
14 Nonetheless,  one point  in Koczanomicz’s  analysis  does appear open to  debate.  This
critical point is the key role played by the notion of carnival, which is coincidentally
the most original and bold theoretical move introduced by the author. According to
Koczanowicz’s interpretation, carnival  is  key to an understanding of the egalitarian
potentiality  of  human  action.  Specifically,  the  notion  of  carnival  “entails  that
democratic society is an activation of the potential embedded in all human relations”
(85).  This potential  involves the possibility of  turning upside down the hierarchical
roles  and  the  vertical  power  relations  structuring  social  life,  working  then  as  a
potential  source  of  democratization.  However,  I  would  suggest  that  this  positive
universalization of carnival could overshadow two sides of this phenomenon: rituality
and violence. 
15 First, carnival is in fact something which owes its meaning to its cyclical exceptionality.
The  ritual  of  carnival  is  something  which,  by  definition,  takes  place  as  an  extra-
ordinary event, confined to a special place in social life and to a special part of the year.
Koczanowicz  makes  it  very  clear  that  in  his  interpretation  carnival  is  a  potential
underlying possibility, rather than something which only ever occurs as an actuality.
Still, this begs the question: what is the relation between the exceptional and ritual side
of  carnival,  and  its  persistance  as  an  underlying  possibility  of  everyday  political
conduct?  Or  more  specifically:  could  we  dispense  with  the  ritual  side  of  carnival,
without losing an important part of its meaning?2
16 Second,  carnival  is  not simply an innocent opportunity to escape temporarily  from
existing established values and roles legitimating the dominant ideology. Rather, it is
also a radical overturning of the kinds of values which limit and control violence. For
instance, the history of Italian organized crime has several episodes in which carnival
and its  attendant  disguises  offered the  opportunity  to  anonymously  kill  or  employ
violence against enemies, or even against innocent people. In this case, carnival also
offers  the opportunity  for  a  temporary return to  brutal  and uncontrolled violence,
without the limits imposed by everyday moral and legal rules. This potentially violent
side of carnival does not find a place in Koczanowicz’s reconstruction. But can we make
use of the concept of carnival, without taking into account the possibility of violence
that it apparently entails? Should not a complete account of the liberating potentiality
of carnival also acknowledge the equally important potentiality of violence which so
often accompanies it? To put it briefly: can we dispense with the ambiguity of carnival
as a source of democratic potentiality and at the same time as a possible source of a
violence  (which,  interestingly,  is  not  necessarily  directed  against  power  and  its
representatives)? Does carnival involve other risks beyond the specific one stressed by
Koczanowicz – i.e. the risk of falling prey of “the seductions of anarchy” (162)?
17 This is, in my opinion, the most relevant issue prompted by the reading of Politics of
Dialogue. 
18 Of course the import of this question goes beyond the specific interpretative issue of
carnival.  Koczanowicz’s  anti-dichotomic  refusal  of  both  consensual  and  agonistic
models of democracy could open the path to a more detailed and insightful analysis of
contemporary  politics.  Specifically,  the  focus  on  a  non-consensual  conception  of
dialogue represents a viable way to recognize the key role played by conflict without
reducing the political dimension to the domain of conflictual insolvable relations. At
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the  same  time,  reference  to  carnival  involves  acknowledging  a  social  and  political
dimension permeated by the ambiguous coexistence of liberating and democratizing
potential and violence. This may be a bit of a stretch, but it is intriguing to analyze the
results  of  recent  electoral  processes  such  as  the  Brexit  referendum  or  the  USA
presidential  elections  in  light  of  this  theory.  Apart  from the obviously  critical  role
played by economic and social conditions, these surprising upsets may indeed be seen
to  express  a  “carnevalesque”  reaction  against  the  “establishment,”  which  does  not
necessarily lead to the development of a more critical democratic community, nor to a
widening of democratic understanding. Even if carnival dynamics are directed towards
power in the figure of the establishment, they may themselves constitute the means of
the  establishment  of  new  power  relations.  Such  remarks  could  bring  a  reader  of
Koczanowicz’s interesting book – at least, they have brought the present reader – to
ask:  could  a  non-consensual  democracy  and  a  critical  community  deal  with  the
ambiguous and potentially dangerous dimension of carnival?
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NOTES
1. See Testa 2017; Mardh & Tryggvason 2017; and Hogan 2015.
2. One might see some similarities between Bakhtin's concept of carnival and Durkheim’s theory
of  ritual  collective  effervescence.  Curiously,  Durkheim’s  voice  is  often  absent  from  political
literature  discussing  collective  phenomena.  See  for  instance  its  significant  exclusion  from
Laclau's  reconstruction of  the  debate  about  the  psychology  of  the  masses  and of  collectives
between the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century (Laclau 2005). 
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